Economic Causes ofDeforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: an Empirical Analysis of the2000s by Jorge Hargrave Gonçalves da Silva
 
Economic Causes of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon:  
An Empirical Analysis of the 2000s
1 
 
Jorge Hargrave Gonçalves da Silva* 
*IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 
 
Resumo:  Esse  artigo  discute  as  recentes  causas  econômicas  e  de  políticas  públicas  do 
desmatamento  na  Amazônia  Legal  Brasileira.  Ele  se  baseia  em  um  modelo  teórico  em  que 
agentes  escolhem  o  quanto  desmatar  de  acordo  com  suas  expectativas  sobre  o  lucro  futuro 
esperado da pecuária e do plantio de soja. O trabalho empírico utiliza principalmente variáveis 
econômicas  e  de  políticas  públicas  que  afetam  as  expectativas  de  lucratividade  dos  agentes. 
Usando dados recentemente lançados e alguns nunca antes analisados em artigos econométricos o 
artigo traz uma análise empírica ao estimar um modelo de painel com 783 cidades da região de 
2002 a 2007. O desmatamento no período se mostra sendo dirigido por flutuações no tempo dos 
preços de carne e de soja, assim como por diferenças no espaço nos preços pagos aos produtores 
em  diferentes  regiões.  Disponibilidade  de  credito  rural,  presença  de  áreas  protegidas  e 
assentamentos de reforma agrária também influenciam as taxas de desmatamento. Além disso, o 
artigo mostra que por alterar a percepção de risco dos agentes, uma maior presença do Ibama 
(polícia ambiental) é efetiva em reduzir as taxas de desmatamento.    
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Abstract: This study discusses the recent economic and policy drivers of deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon. It is based on a theoretical framework in which agents choose how much forest 
to  clear  based  on  their  expectations  about  future  profits  from  cattle  ranching  and  soybean 
cropping. The empirical study is based on economic and policy variables that affect this expected 
profitability.  Using  newly  launched  and  some  never-before  analyzed  datasets,  it  provides 
empirical evidence by estimating a model using panel data for 783 municipalities of the region 
from 2002 to 2007. Deforestation in the period is found to be driven by fluctuations in meat and 
soybean  prices  over  time,  as  well  as  differences  in  prices  paid  to  producers  over  space. 
Availability of rural credit, presence of protected areas and rural reform settlements also influence 
deforestation rates. Moreover this study shows that by impacting the risk perception of agents, 
higher  presence  of  the  Brazilian  Environmental  Police  (Ibama)  was  effective  in  reducing 
deforestation rates. 
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1 This paper is based on the master thesis “Economic Causes of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: An 
Empirical Analysis”, presented at the Master in Economics and Politics Program at the University of Freiburg, 
Germany, in July, 2009.  
1. Introduction 
Deforestation of tropical forests, especially in the case of the Brazilian Amazon, is one of the 
most  debated  topics  in  the  environmental  field  today.  The  issues  involving  deforestation  of 
tropical forests cover a wide range from environmental problems, such as the cause of carbon 
emissions in the context of the Global Warming Process or the loss of biodiversity, the provision 
of essential ecosystem services to economical and social concerns such as income generation for 
the traditional and poor population that live in the area (SEEHUSEN 2007).  
The deforestation process has not taken place constantly either over space or time. Over space it 
is highly concentrated in the so called “deforestation arch”. On a time perspective, after being 
state driven from the 1960s to the 1980s, from the 1990s on, it assumed a new dynamic more 
linked to market forces, with special presence of cattle ranching and soybean cropping, with its 
ups and downs closely related to the changes in the economic context (FEARNSIDE 2005). 
The majority of the existing economic literature about deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon can 
be divided into two groups. The larger group focuses on explaining deforestation during this state 
driven period from the 1960s to the 1980s. The second, and more recent group, analyzes recent 
data  and  tries  to  access  the  new  drivers  of  the  deforestation,  which  are  more  related  to  an 
economic  endogenous  process.  However,  most  of  these  new  studies  incorporate  only  cross-
sectional aspects of it (e.g. ARIMA ET AL. 2007), leaving the recent time dynamics mostly 
unexplained. Another characteristic of the existing literature is that, for different reasons, it has 
focused more on what Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) call the “direct causes of deforestation”. 
This study deviates from the existing literature in these two aspects. Firstly, it focuses on the 
dynamics of the yearly deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon from 2002 to 2007. During this 
period deforestation rates have been above historical levels. More important than that however, is 
the fact that within this relatively short period, deforestation rates have fluctuated significantly 
(INPE 2009). Although there exists significant amount of media reports, some scientific papers 
and anecdotal evidence that most of these fluctuations were driven by the movements of meat and 
soybean prices, this hypothesis “has never been submitted to a rigorous econometrical analysis” 
(EWERS ET AL. 2008). Using panel data from all 783 municipalities of the Legal Amazon area, 
I assess the drivers that caused these yearly fluctuations in the deforestation rates of the region.  
Secondly it focuses on economic and policy drivers that influence the expected profitability of 
different land use methods and therefore affect agents’ decisions concerning land use choices.  
Another main contribution of this study is to put together and analyze some data that has never 
been analyzed, or at least not with the necessary depth, such as the data on yearly fluctuations of 
national annual meat and soybean prices, official rural credit by municipality, and municipal 
environmental fines from the Brazilian Environmental Police (Ibama). 
The main results show that deforestation rates, during this period, were strongly affected by the 
evolution  of  the  main  economic  and  policy  variables  studied.  According  to  the  theoretical 
framework used, by having an effect on the expected profitability of different land use methods, 
these  variables  directly  affect  agents’  land  use  choices  and  therefore  deforestation  decisions. 
While controlling for several relevant factors, I find empirical evidence that increases in meat and 
soybean prices, and in the availability of official rural credit are associated with increases in the 
deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon. This supports the claims made by media and many 
non-econometrical studies (e.g. BARRETO ET AL. 2008, THE ECONOMIST 2008).   
The  biggest  novelty  brought  by  this  study  is  the  empirical  evidence  showing  that  the 
environmental fines at the municipality level had a statistically significant effect in decreasing the 
deforestation rates during the studied period.  
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: the next section presents some stylized facts 
that were the motivation for my empirical work. Afterwards I briefly review the literature on 
econometrical  studies  about  deforestation  of  the  Brazilian  Amazon.  The  following  sections 
contain a theoretical framework, the description of the dataset used in the empirical part and its 
model specification. I then present the empirical results of the analyzed dataset. The last section 
concludes and highlights the policy implications as well as provides scope for future research. 
 
2. Stylized facts 
There is almost a consensus in the media and in the literature that cattle ranching and soybean 
cropping are among the most important recent causes of deforestation in the region (NEPSTAD 
ET AL. 2006a, THE ECONOMIST 2008). There are compelling arguments and descriptive data 
to support this fact. Soybean cropping and cattle ranching have expanded significantly in the 
region during the last 15 years. The region’s cattle herd, for example, almost tripled from 26 
million in 1995 to 73 million in 2006 (BARRETO ET AL. 2008). Several studies showed that the 
expansion  of  cattle  ranching  basically  coincides  with  the  deforestation  arch,  and  that 
deforestation is highly correlated with it (e.g. ANDERSEN AND REIS 1997, PRATES 2008).  
National and international press, as well as NGOs, politicians and the academic community have 
been  claiming  that  the  deforestation  rates  during  the  2000s  have  been  very  influenced  by 
fluctuations in international market prices of soybean and meat (e.g. NEPSTAD ET AL. 2006a, 
BARRETO  ET  AL.  2008,  THE  ECONOMIST  2008).  During  the  2000s  deforestation  rates 
became closely correlated with the prices of these two commodities, both in spatial (ARIMA ET 
AL. 2007), and in the time dimension (BARRETO ET AL. 2008). Graph 1 shows the fluctuations 
of soybean and meat prices in Brazilian currency (R$) and the deforestation rates from 1995 to 
2007.  However  compelling  the  story,  to  my  knowledge,  and  also  according  to  Ewers  at  al. 
(2008), no econometric empirical study has been published analyzing this interaction in detail.  
 








































































































Source: Adapted from Barreto et al. (2008)  
Fluctuations in the availability of rural credit in the region seem also to be closely connected to 
the deforestation rates in the region (BARRETO ET AL. 2008). Another claim made by the 
Brazilian Government is that environmental fines were important, essentially after 2005, for the 
decrease in deforestation rates. This has also never been submitted to any rigorous econometric 
analysis. 
All the effects described above came into play simultaneously, but with different intensities in 
distinct parts of the region. In order to disentangle the influence that each one of them had on the 
recent fluctuation in the deforestation rates an appropriately specified econometric model with a 
finer scale than the region as a whole is necessary. The aim of this study is precisely to build such 
a model in order to disentangle all these influences. 
 
3. Literature review 
Given the short length of this paper and that this is an empirical work, literature review will be 
brief and will focus only on empirical works that analyze variables which are among the most 
important variables that I tested. For a thoroughly literature review please refer to Kaimowitz ad 
Angelsen (1998). 
The major part of economic literature on the topic still uses panel data from old periods (1960-
1995)  (e.g.  PFAFF  1999,  ANDERSEN  ET  AL.  2002)  or  cross-section  from  the  2000s  (e.g. 
ARIMA  ET  AL.  2007).  The  first  group  brings  up  typical  explanatory  variables  such  as 
population (ANDERSEN 1996, KIRBY ET AL. 2006), roads (e.g. ANDERSEN 1996, PFAFF 
1999), cattle herd (REIS AND GUZMAN 1992, ANDERSEN AND REIS 1997, PRATES 2008), 
and rainfall (e.g. MARGULIS 2003, ARIMA ET AL. 2007, AGUIAR ET AL. 2008). These are 
the  causes  of  deforestation  that  are  not  analyzed  by  this  paper  since  they  are  not  decision 
parameters of deforestation agents. Other recent papers argue that these drivers may not be the 
actual causes of deforestation. Pfaff (1999), for example, finds population to be endogenous. 
Other  studies  show  that  causality,  from  roads  to  deforestation  could  be  more  intense  in  the 
opposite direction and that their effects depend on where the roads are built (e.g. ANDERSEN 
ET AL. 2002, WEINHOLD AND REIS 2008).  
The second group brings up variables which are more relevant for my analysis. The effects of 
differences in prices paid to producers is found to influence deforestation by Arima et al. (2007) 
cross-section wise and with a short panel by Prates (2008) using a short panel from 2000 to 2004. 
Prates (2008) also finds credit availability to fuel deforestation. For old periods, using less robust 
proxies, Andersen (1996) found it to explain deforestation from 1975 to 1985.  
The presence of protected areas is believed by many authors, using different methodologies, to 
decrease fire incidence or deforestation (ARIMA ET AL. 2007, AGUIAR ET AL. 2008). 
There are not any econometric studies which focus on the effectiveness of the Ibama fighting 
illegal deforestation. The first attempt is made by Barreto et al. (2009), who estimate how high 
would  the deforestation rates be without the measures taken by Ibama in 2008. The author argues 
that the difference to the observed values corresponds to its effectiveness. 
  
4. Theoretical framework 
A significant part of the econometrical studies about deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon does 
not explicitly use a theoretical framework (e.g. ANDERSEN ET AL. 2002, KIRBY ET AL. 
2006). These studies usually use reduced form models and some in combination with a general-
to-simple approach. They start with a large number of demand and supply variables that may 
affect deforestation and reduce it step-by-step in order to find the most relevant variables
2. I 
chose to explicitly use a theoretical framework because of some reasons. First, using a theoretical 
framework facilitates the description of the expected relations between variables and makes it 
more explicit. Second, it makes the assumptions of the model more explicit and facilitates the 
debate  about  them.  Third,  the  aim  of  this  study  is  not  to  exhaust  all  possible  causes  of 
deforestation but to discuss the relevance of some economic and policy influenced drivers of its 
recent fluctuations
3.  
With some modifications, the theoretical framework used here is based on one of the models 
presented by Angelsen (1999). I will follow the framework that the author called the “small, open 
economy with open access and deforestation leading to private property”. I chose this model 
because it is the one that has characteristics that are similar to the Brazilian Amazon region and 
also because it has some desired features, such as exogenously given prices, population being 
endogenously determined, production sold at markets, and badly defined property rights with 
clearing leading to the obtaining of land tittles (ANGELSEN 1999). 
In my specific model, deforestation size (D) is a positive function of the expected difference 
between the expected profits (revenues - costs) of unsustainable land uses (
d d C R - ) (logging 
followed by deforestation and agriculture or cattle ranching) and sustainable land uses (
s s C R - ). 
The larger the differential, the larger deforestation is expected to be: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
s s d d C R C R E f D - - - =                                                (1) 
Even recognizing that what matters is the relative rent from sustainable versus unsustainable land 
use, due to the complexity and still incipient role that sustainable land uses plays in the region, it 
would be difficult to estimate its rents. I hence chose to assume it as constant and focus on the 
fluctuations of expected profits from cattle ranching and soybean cropping. Another reason to 
exclude them is that most of the services provided by forests have public goods’ characteristics 
and  therefore  are  mostly  ignored  in  the  individual  decision  making  (ANGELSEN  1999, 
SEEHUSEN 2007).  
Deforestation is basically driven by the expected future profits of cattle ranching and soybean 
cropping. The higher the expected profitability of these two main activities is, the higher the 
incentives for farmers to clear one forested area and the higher I expect the deforestation rate to 
be.  
                                                 
2 Some studies even introduce a “random reduction” methodology through which they manage to reduce the degree 
of  arbitrariness  on  a  researcher’s  hand  once  having  chosen  the  most  relevant  variables  (Andersen  et  al.  2002, 
Weinhold and Reis 2008). 
3 Due to the obvious and likely possibility of omitted variables, during the model specification I make explicit how I 
expect  the  variables  used  to  be  affected  by  possibly  omitted  variables  and  to  be  sometimes  proxies  for  them. 
However this should not affect the validity of the conclusions.  
Expected revenues of unsustainable land uses [E(
d R )] is determined by revenues of logging (
l R ) 
and expected revenues from agriculture and cattle ranching (
a R ) (equation 2), which is in turn 
determined by prices of meat (
m P ), prices of soybean (
s P ), agents market access and conditions, 
proxied by the  meat price index (
m I ), and some initial conditions that are specific for each 
municipality ( IC ) (equation 3). 
)) ( , ( ) (
a l d R E R f R E =                                                        (1) 
) , , , ( ) ( IC I P P f R E
m s m a =                                                     (3) 
Unsustainable land use costs are in turn determined by direct costs of clearing (
c C ), expected 
agricultural and cattle ranching costs (
a C ), credit availability (Cr ) and the risk of being fined by 
the environmental police (RI ): 
) , ), ( , ( ) ( RI Cr C E C f C E
a c d =                                                   (4) 
Agents maximize the expected profits from land use by choosing a level of clearing activity that 
will be implemented in the next period (D), taking into consideration prices of meat (
m P ) and 
soybean (
s P ) as follows: 
))) , ( ( (
s m P P E Max p                                                           (5) 
w.r.t D 
s.t. 
a c l m C C R Cr RI IC I ; ; ; ; ; ;                                                    (6) 
Where:  = p profits from agricultural use of cleared area.  
Agents  are  constrained  by  their  initial  market  conditions  and  access  (
m I )  and  specific 
municipality  characteristics  (IC ),  such  as  distance  to  Brasília,  initial  deforestation  and 
population. On the policy side they face given credit availability (Cr ) and risk of being caught 
illegally clearing by the environmental police (RI). They also face economic costs of clearing 
(
c C ) and of agricultural and cattle ranching inputs and necessary investments (
a C ) (equation 6). 
One could divide the drivers of expected profits into three groups: market conditions, policy 
influence and natural or initial conditions. For the first, I conjecture that if prices of meat and 
soybean increase, there should be an upward pressure on deforestation. To assess the differences 
in the price paid to producers through a spatial perspective (which proxies market conditions and 
access), I use an index based on Arima et al. (2007). This index captures the differences in the 
farmgate  prices  paid  to  producers  of  cattle  in  one  moment  in  time.  Higher  prices  paid  at  a 
farmgate level lead to higher profitability expectation and should increase deforestation as well.  
On the policy influence group I hypothesize that larger availability of official subsidized credit 
increases deforestation. The rational is that credit is not pushing deforestation; rather it only 
makes the clearing plans resulting from higher expected profits possible. Environmental fines 
applied by Ibama are modeled as a risk factor of clearing. Given any expected profitability, a 
positive chance that an agent could be fined for illegal clearing has a negative effect on his 
expected profitability. As a result higher fines intensity should lead to lower deforestation rates. 
Lastly, protected areas should work as a barrier to deforestation whereas the existence of agrarian 
rural reform settlements in one municipality is hypothesized to fuel clearing.   
On the natural and initial conditions side, several variables are considered as controls. I expect 
deforestation to be higher where the distance to Brasilia, as a proxy for transport costs, and 
rainfall are lower
4. Initial population and deforestation are proxies of how far the deforestation 
process is in each municipality. The hypothesis is that larger initial population and deforestation 
rates are associated with more advanced occupation and thus higher municipal clearing rates. 
 
5. Data 
This  study  deals  with  data  of  deforestation  by  municipality  from  2002  to  2007.  I  chose  the 
municipal scale because it is the finest scale of deforestation possible to which data for several 
economic  and  policy  variables  such  as  credit  and  fines  can  also  be  found.  Basic  summary 
statistics are presented in table 1
5. 
The  data  on  municipal  deforestation  comes  from  the  Prodes  project  of  the  Brazilian  Space 
Research Institute (INPE)
6. All economic variables were deflated by IPCA – the official Brazilian 
consumer  price  index
7.  Meat  prices  were  obtained  at  Anualpec  (2009)  that  reports  monthly 
average price received by cattle ranchers in Brazil
8. The Meat Price Index is the same used in 
Arima  et  al.  (2007)
9.  This  index  should  essentially  reflect  the  transport  costs  from  each 
municipality to the main consumer markets and also local market conditions. For soybeans I used 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) monthly average prices received by farmers for the 60kg bag
10.  
Availability of official subsidized rural credit was obtained at the Rural Credit Annual Report of 
the  Brazilian  Central  Bank.  The  figures  reflect  the  annual  flow  of  credit  granted  to  rural 
properties in each municipality within the official rural credit system
11.  
                                                 
4 There are two possible theoretical links between rainfall and profitability. First, the higher rainfall rates, the more 
difficult it is to construct and conserve roads, which increases transport costs. More indirectly, higher precipitation 
(after a certain threshold) leads to lower productivity for both cattle ranching and soybean cropping (ARIMA ET AL. 
2007). 
5 Tables and graphs in the appendix. 
6 Deforestation is reported from September of one year to August of the following year. It is important to notice that 
degradation in the forest caused by logging can not be assessed. 
7 Although this may not be the perfect deflator for the Amazon region and for agricultural prices, the non-existence 
of a special deflator for it was the most important reason for its choice. Meat prices are deflated by IGP as they are 
published by FGV and at the Anualpec (Annual cattle ranching survey). I ran some specifications with credit and 
soybean prices deflated by IGP (inflation index with higher weights for wholesale) and also with nominal data but 
results did not change significantly. 
8 For 15kg of Boi Gordo. I calculated annual averages from September of one year to August of following year and 
also deflated accordingly to match the period in which deforestation is measured by INPE. 
9 Adjusted to municipal base instead of pixel based. It was calculated based on field interviews that assessed prices 
paid at slaughterhouses all over the region. These prices were then discounted considering average transport costs 
and the availability of roads in each pixel of the region in order to estimate a farmgate (or pixel wise) meat price 
using GIS software. I normalized this information and transformed the prices into an index that indicates how 
municipal meat prices deviate from average prices at one point in time. Although this study was conducted in 2001 
to  my  knowledge  it  is  the  best  proxy  available  to  assess  the  variability  of  prices  paid  among  Amazonian 
municipalities. 
10 Also average from September of one year to August of the following year. 
11 This system operates with fixed rules and very low fixed interest rates determined by the government that do not 
depend  on  market interest  rates.  Therefore it is  enough to  use  credit  availability  and  not include  interest  rates 
fluctuation in our model since it is the main credit line to producers.  
The percentage of the municipality area under official environmental protection such as National 
Parks  or  Indigenous  Areas  was  obtained  from  Imazon  (Amazon  Institute  of  People  and  the 
Environment). I use as a proxy the available data for 2006 extrapolated to all other years, as if it 
would be constant over the entire period, even knowing it was not
12. A similar proxy is made for 
the share of municipality area that is under an agrarian reform project. I use data obtained at 
Imazon of area of agrarian reform settlement projects by municipality for 2008.  
Data on environmental fines were obtained at Ibama. Recognizing that fines are, to a certain 
extent, endogenous to deforestation, I use the amount of issued fines by municipality divided by 
deforestation observed in the period. This variable proxies the intensity of Ibama presence in each 
municipality and is now independent of the amount of deforestation in each municipality
13. 
As for the control variables, distance to Brasilia, municipal area, and population at the beginning 
of the period analyzed were obtained at the Brazilian Statistic and Geography Institute (IBGE). 
Given the impossibility of receiving a complete dataset of annual municipal rainfall, I work with 
two proxies: one that accomplishes the spatial differences in rainfall severity among the different 
municipalities and another that takes into consideration the annual fluctuations from 2002 to 2007 
that affected the region as a whole. The second proxy in particular, should be seen cautiously
14.   
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
  Nr. obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Deforestation 4566 1.739 1.747 0.000 7.248
Meat price 4566 35.695 3.566 29.160 38.850
Index meat price 5292 0.689 0.091 0.077 0.788
Soy price 5327 22.614 5.476 16.855 31.217
Protected areas 4566 3.857 3.722 0.000 11.834
Credit 4294 13.928 1.796 6.732 18.888
Area 4566 7.829 1.357 4.174 11.981
Fines intensity 1882 0.701 0.910 0.004 6.646
Settlement areas 4566 3.104 2.764 0.000 9.291
Initial deforested area 5327 762.313 1,066.893 0.000 9,690.400
Initial population 5215 2.590 7.946 0.070 128.584
Distance to Brasilia 5215 1.326 0.539 0.307 2.868
Rainfall over space 4753 30.452 66.609 1.518 686.658
Rainfall over time 4566 0.973 0.183 0.740 1.220
Meat price x index 5292 3.558 0.260 1.163 3.861
Note: All variables but meat price, initial population, distance to Brasilia, initial
deforestation, rain over space and time and soy price are presented with natural logs.  
 
                                                 
12  I  do  not  discriminate  between  the  three  types  of  protected  areas  present  in  the  region  (integral  protection, 
sustainable use and indigenous areas). 
13 I used number of fines issued instead of value since only a small part of the fines are actually paid. So number is a 
proxy for how intensive is the presence of Ibama in a municipality. (BARRETO ET AL. 2008) 
14 The fluctuations across space were estimated based on year rainfall observed in each municipality from 2005 to 
2007 gently provided by Imazon. I use the average rainfall per municipality for this period as a rainfall index. The 
yearly fluctuations are a rougher proxy. The only public available data is the data on some rainfall measurement 
stations for some cities in the region provided by INMET. So I constructed an index which is the average yearly 
rainfall of 10 of these stations, trying to pick stations well distributed allover the region.  
6. Model specification 
One important innovation of this study is its concentration on the analysis of deforestation only 
where there is forest. This seems fairly obvious. Nevertheless, the majority of the studies until 
now have focused on the Brazilian Legal Amazon, which encompasses large areas with little 
forest remaining (highly deforested) or Cerrado areas (Tropical Savanna). These Cerrado areas 
were therefore never forested by Amazon forest, therefore no deforestation is possible there since 
only deforestation of the Amazon forest is reported by INPE. In studies including areas with low 
levels of forest, low deforestation rates can occur due to two reasons: first there are factors that 
keep the forest standing. Second, there is no (or almost no) forest to be cleared. While researches 
are trying to access the causes for the first reason, since dataset is “dirty” with second reason 
cases, analyses are biased. To avoid this kind of problem I create a filter so that I analyze only 
areas with at least 20% of forest cover in 2002. With this filter I eliminate a large part of the 
municipalities  that  have  little  Amazon  forest  and  therefore  follow  a  different  environmental, 
economic and social dynamic
15. With this cleaner dataset we can actually assess the real drivers 
of deforestation where there is actually forest
16.  
In order to get to our reduced form estimated equation a number of assumptions are necessary: 
first, expected profits from sustainable use are assumed to be zero (or at least constant). Second, 
since  some  variables  are  not  directly  observable  or  have  no  data  available,  such  as  logging 
revenues, clearing costs, agricultural and ranching costs, and risk of clearing, I assume all of them 
to be constant so that they do not influence fluctuations in profitability expectations.  
We observe fluctuations in meat and soybean prices at a national level, as well as cleared area, 
meat  price  index,  credit  availability,  fines,  area  under  protection,  rural  settlements  area,  and 
initial conditions such as distance to Brasilia, initial population, and level of initial clearing and 
typical rainfall at a municipal level. 
In the main estimated equation I use meat price lagged in one year to take in consideration the 
yearly fluctuations of national meat prices and the meat price index to account for the differences 
of prices paid to producers over space. I do not include soybean prices in the main specification 
but in some alternative specifications. These two prices are highly correlated due to the dynamics 
of international commodity markets and also exchange rate movements
17. Therefore it is hard to 
disentangle the effect of each of them. Since cattle is widespread throughout the whole region, 
and  soybean  in  concentrated  in  the  South,    most  of  the  time  I  use  only  the  meat  price,  but 
recognize that this might be partially capturing the effect of soybean price fluctuations. I also 
include  rural  credit  availability,  protected  areas  and  settlement  area  by  municipality.  I  also 
include fines intensity as a proxy for the risk of deforestation and area of each municipality.  
                                                 
15 With the 20% filter, for example, I eliminate a large part of the municipalities of the States of Mato Grosso (47%), 
Maranhao (58%), and Tocantins (97%). And only a small part of Acre and Amapá (0%), Amazonas (2%), Roraima 
(13%),  Rondônia  (23%),  Pará  (38%).  For  Maranhao  specifically,  I  had  to  drop  the  whole  state  since  data  for 
environmental fines are not available for one year. However, I did the analysis with Maranhao and excluding the 
missing year and results do not change significantly. 
16 This corresponds to 400 municipalities out of the 783 cities of the Legal Amazon. The 20% threshold was chosen 
since it is the largest possible sample in which all explanatory variables behave close to their average behavior. Since 
I had to exclude all municipalities from MA, it reduces the sample to 318 municipalities. Moreover because of some 
data missing for one or other variable, the main specifications have 294 municipalities.   
17 Correlation is 0,76.  
The  main  dependent  variable  is  the  amount  of  yearly  new  deforested  cleared  area  by 
municipality.  In  most  of  the  specifications  I  use  level  variables.  For  these,  I  control  for 
municipality area given the wide range of municipality sizes and the main role that it plays in 
determining all level variables
18. The main estimated equation is: 
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Where:  = Pr Protected areas;  = St Rural settlement area;  = A Municipality area;  = S Vector with 
controls;  = e Robust-clustered error term. 
I use least squares for panel data and present results both for fixed effects and random effects 
models
19. Fixed effects (FE) should be used when we assume that there are municipality specific 
non-observable  effects.  This  method  considers  that  there  are  unit  (municipality)  specific 
characteristics  which  are  constant  over  time  and  are  captured  by  a  i a   specific  for  each 
municipality  (GREENE  1997).  Random  effects  (RE)  should  be  used  if  we  consider  that  the 
resulting effect of several omitted variables, affecting units and years, is randomly distributed 
over time and municipalities and therefore uncorrelated with other explanatory variables (HSIAO 
2003). If its more restrictive assumption, that omitted variables are uncorrelated with explanatory 
variables, holds, it is more efficient. However it can be inconsistent if the assumption does not 
hold (WOOLDRIDGE 2002).  
In order to decide between using RE and FE models I performed the Hausman test. It suggested 
that RE and FE coefficients estimates are statistically different and therefore I should use FE 
method because it is more likely to consistent. In table 2 and 3 I present results from FE and RE 
estimates. Coefficients of both models have the same signs, comparable sizes and are highly 
significant. Given that their results are similar, in tables 4 and 5 I present estimation results from 
RE regressions. The reason for this is that this way time invariant variables, which are important 
determinants of the deforestation process, can also be included in the analysis. Variables for 
which  only  one  observation  was  available  include  the  meat  price  index  (measuring  relative 
remoteness and transport costs), and the size of protected and settlement areas. Only by using the 
RE method can I test the relationship of these important variables with deforestation. 
To reduce the effects of not working with FE models, and as suggested by Weinhold and Reis 
(2008), in some specifications  I include several controls to account for  municipality  specific 
(time-invariant) fixed effects. Among the controls used are state dummies, municipality area, 
municipal  specific  average  rainfall,  distance  to  Brasilia,  initial  deforestation  and  population. 
However there might be more effects that I do not capture such as the existence of roads for 
which I could not get reliable data on time.  
In order to control for time-variant (year-specific) effects, in some specifications I also include 
year dummies and region wise yearly rainfall variation. The meat price index should also work as 
                                                 
18 In table 2 this is not necessary, since I use densities (each variable divided by municipality area). Meat price, meat 
index and soy prices are not divided by area; fines intensity are not either since it is already divided by deforestation. 
The dependent variable is deforestation of one year divided by forest at the beginning of that year. 
19 Regressions were run with the xtreg function of  STATA 10.0, with error terms clustered and corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
a  proxy  to  control  for  the  initial  conditions.  Following  several  other  previous  studies  (e.g. 
ANDERSEN 1996, AGUIAR ET AL. 2007) I use logarithmic forms for all variables.  
Typically panel data on deforestation suffers from both: spatial and time-series autocorrelation 
(FERRAZ 2001). To deal with spatial autocorrelation many authors explicitly modeled the effect 
of neighboring area deforestation rates in each municipality (e.g. ARIMA et al. 2007, AGUIAR 
ET AL. 2007). Due to lack of time and of GIS software knowledge, I did not do it. However, I 
follow Ferraz (2001) and Weinhold and Reis (2008) and also use robust and clustered standard 
errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  for  some  variables,  such  as  credit  availability  or  fines 
intensity, one could expect causality to run in both directions, which could bias the coefficients. 
For example, if demand for subsidized credit increases with deforestation activities, this would 
bias  the  coefficients  on  credit  availability  upwards,  and  thus  results  on  credit  should  be 
interpreted with caution. Similar rational could be applied for the strictness of the local police (in 
giving out fines) responding to current deforestation activities. 
 
7. Results 
7.1. Main results and interpretation 
The overall results support most of the hypothesis made in the theoretical framework. Not only 
do all the most important coefficients have the expected signs, but also the main variables and 
controls interact in the expected way. The results are also robust across different specifications 
including modeling with levels and densities, and random and fixed effects. 
As the main driver of the expected profitability, increases in meat price in one year are associated 
with increases in deforestation rates in the following year. The variable is highly significant and 
robust through all different specifications. In table 2 and 3 not only does its robustness become 
clear, but also its relationship with other variables. For example, in table 2, columns II and V, the 
meat price coefficient is smaller when I include soybean price fluctuations. For the majority of 
the specifications, I use meat prices fluctuations in space and time separately since I have two 
different datasets for each dimension.  
Increases in soybean prices are associated with increases in deforestation rates in the same year 
and are robust across different specifications. Also as expected, its coefficients are typically half 
the size of the one of the meat price (table 2 and 3, columns II and V). The smaller size should 
reflect the fact that soybean plantations are restricted to a relatively small area of the region.  
For  credit,  larger  credit  volumes  are  associated  with  higher  deforestation  rates  in  all  tested 
specifications, and it is significant in most of the main equations. Even if partially endogenous 
(since it depends on credit demand), credit granting is also the result of an exogenous political 
decision since it is part of a governmental regional development strategy. My hypothesis is that 
credit is not pushing deforestation, but only making it possible.  
Fines present the most robust results among all variables. Increases in the intensity of fines are 
associated  with  decreases  in  deforestation  rates.  Not  only  is  it  highly  significant  in  all 
specifications,  but  also  its  coefficients  show  little  change with the  introduction  of  additional 
controls or when using FE models. Protected areas seem to represent a barrier to deforestation, 
while  the  existence  of  agrarian  reform  settlement  areas  is  significantly  linked  to  higher  
deforestation rates. Higher rainfall over space and time are associated with lower deforestation 
rates (table 5, columns III, IV and VI)
20.  
When I mention control variables in the tables, I imply municipal distance to Brasilia, initial 
deforestation  of  2002  and  population in  2000. In  several  cases  I  also include state  and  year 
dummy variables to capture possible fixed local characteristics or special year events, but they do 
not significantly alter the results
21. 
Table 2: Main results in levels  
I II III IV V VI
RE RE RE FE FE FE
Meat price 0.075*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.073*** 0.034*** 0.046***
(14.49) (6.24) (7.24) (13.93) (5.13) (6.88)
Index meat price 0.944** 1.023** -0.055
(2.19) (2.35) (0.09)
Soya prices 0.027*** 0.032***
(7.26) (8.62)
Credit 0.132*** 0.117*** 0.035 0.057** 0.032 0.023
(6.76) (6.07) (1.60) (2.23) (1.28) (0.86)
Fines intensity -0.784*** -0.776*** -0.765*** -0.763*** -0.753*** -0.764***
(15.69) (15.64) (15.40) (14.71) (14.64) (14.32)
Protected areas -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.032**
(3.97) (4.10) (2.07)
Settlement 0.165*** 0.171*** 0.098***
(8.35) (8.47) (5.02)
Area 0.567*** 0.578*** 0.468***
(9.14) (9.22) (7.58)
Constant -6.858*** -6.288*** -3.639*** 0.475 1.454*** 1.832***
(10.83) (9.78) (4.25) (1.08) (3.33) (3.66)
Control variables No Yes Yes No No No
Year dummy No Yes Yes No No yes
State dummy No Yes Yes No No No
Observations 1370 1370 1336 1370 1370 1336
Number of Municipalities 294 294 285 294 294 285
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.72 0.50 0.53 0.54
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. R-squared is overall for RE and within for FE models.




                                                 
20 Controlling for rainfall makes the meat price index flip sign (table 4, columns III, IV and VI). This probably means 
that this index embodies to certain extent information about space rainfall variation. When in combination with year 
dummies the yearly rainfall fluctuation also flips sign (table 4, columns III and IV). This can be because they are all 
capturing mostly the same thing. 
21 Initial deforestation area and initial population have the expected positive sign. The first is consistently significant 
and the second is not in most of the cases. Distance to Brasilia has the expected negative sign and is significant only 
in some specifications and here it is a proxy for transport costs. All time invariant variables are dropped out in the FE 
regressions.  
Table 3: Main results in densities 
I II III IV V VI
RE RE RE FE FE FE
Meat price 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(11.53) (4.00) (5.83) (11.28) (3.92) (5.86)
Index meat price 0.040*** 0.040*** (0.01)
(4.32) (4.26) (1.15)
Soya prices 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.76) (5.10)
Credit density 2.455*** 2.253*** 1.132*** 3.633*** 2.983*** 2.498***
(3.89) (3.79) (3.34) (4.86) (4.75) (4.15)
Fines intensity -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(8.14) (8.02) (6.39) (5.93) (5.85) (5.98)
Protected areas density -0.016*** -0.016*** (0.00)
(3.05) (3.12) (0.78)
Settlement density 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.024**
(5.12) (5.08) (2.46)
Constant -0.064*** -0.050*** (0.03) -0.039*** -0.024*** -0.018**
(7.24) (5.59) (1.61) (6.74) (3.87) (2.57)
Control variables No No Yes No No No
Year dummy No No Yes No No Yes
State dummy No No Yes No No No
Observations 1370 1370 1336 1370 1370 1336
Number of Municipalities 294 294 285 294 294 285
R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.45 0.18 0.20 0.22
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. R-squared is overall for RE and within for FE models.
Control varibles include distance to Brasilia, initial deforestation in 2002 and population in 2000.
Dependent variable: ln(deforestation / area)
 
 
7.2. Further results and robustness checks 
One innovation of this study is that it assesses the robustness of each of the main explanatory 
variables  to  a  variation  of  the  number  of  municipalities  analyzed.  In  order  to  diminish  the 
discretionarity of the choice of the 20% filter, I assess how each of the main variables would 
behave with larger and smaller samples. The results are presented in graph 2. By eye balling we 
can  see  that  with  between  15%  and  70%  of  minimum  initial  forest  cover  (or  excluding  the 
extremes) the coefficients do not depart so much from an average value. After 70%, there are less 
than 120 municipalities in the sample and variables present a different behavior with all of them 
converging  towards  zero.  This  convergence  is  expected  since  this  small  sample  consists  of 
regions almost fully forested (and probably of difficult access) where little deforestation takes 
place and market forces are expected to be lower.  With between 0% and 15% of the minimum 
initial forest cover, variables also present a different path from their average. These parts of the 
region are totally integrated with markets and have little forest remaining. Thus studies about 
deforestation dynamics and its causes should exclude these extreme areas and focus on the areas 
where we indeed observe forest and with a similar path and threat of deforestation.  In terms of 
confidence intervals, there is a clear increase in it when we decrease the number of observations 
(going to the right in the graph) and therefore the estimates become less reliable.  
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I also performed several robustness checks by creating different variable definitions and changing 
model specifications. In table 4 (columns I, II and III), I interact meat price index (which is 
specific for each municipality but constant over time) with yearly fluctuations of meat price in an 
attempt  to  estimate  what  would  theoretically  be  the  yearly  meat  price  fluctuations  for  each 
municipality of the region. This is the first study that tries to estimate it. This estimation is done 
in two different ways (columns I and II versus III). 
In  table 4  (columns  IV  and  V)  a  dummy  variable  indicating  locations that  had  a  significant 
soybean  production  (1  if  there  is  production,  0  if  not),  and  its  interaction  with  the  national 
soybean prices are tested together with the national price. In line with the theoretical framework, 
the interaction term is positive and significant, showing that the positive impact on deforestation 
from higher soybean prices gets amplified in municipalities that produce it
22. The puzzling result 
here is that the dummy has a negative sign, indicating that, everything else remaining constant, 
municipalities with significant soybean production have, on average, lower deforestation rates 
than other municipalities. This may reflect that this production is done in municipalities already 
highly cleared, with little remaining forest to be cleared
23.  
Data on both credit and fines are not reported for many municipalities. It is unclear whether these 
are missing values or if they would be zeros. In most of the specifications, I consider them as 
missing values, what reduces the sample. In table 5, columns I and II, I test what would happen if 
we consider them to be reported as zeros. Since there are less missing values, the number of 
                                                 
22 With this, I could estimate local annual prices for soybean for each municipality where soybean cropping took 
place. However, price in other localities is not observed. Even recognizing that it is a strong assumption, I then 
assumed that where no production took place prices were zero – so production was not economically viable.  
23  In  the  same  table  in  column  VI,  I  use  a  different  soybean  price  measurement  derived  from  the  Municipal 
Agricultural Survey (PAM). This method also brings us significant results and a coefficient in line with the prior 
results using national prices. 
  
observations slightly increases and significance of the new variables where zeros were inputted is 
similar to the original ones and coefficient of fine intensity is similar, but coefficients of credit 
are smaller if compared to specifications of table 2 (columns I and II). 
In columns III, IV and VI, I also introduce new controls for rainfall over time and space. Rainfall 
over space is robust among all specifications. Rain over time, which is a rougher estimate, is not 
robust throughout different specifications. Additionally, in table 5 (columns V and VI) we see 
that using real fines in Reais (R$) instead of number of fines (as in all other specifications) would 
not change the sign and significance of this variable (compared to table 2 columns I and II). 
 
Table 4: Further results changing meat and soybean price definitions 
I II III IV V VI
RE RE RE RE RE RE
Meat price 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.072***
(6.27) (3.28) (14.98)
Index meat price 1.021** (0.03) 0.823*
(2.33) (0.04) (1.88)
Meat price * index 0.067*** 0.018*
(13.82) (1.77)
Meat price + index 0.060***
(12.66)
Soya prices 0.021*** 0.027***
(5.17) (4.85)
Dummy soya -0.829*** -1.173***
(3.51) (4.47)
Soy prices * dummy 0.044*** 0.049***
(4.33) (4.78)
Local soy price 0.025***
(3.77)
Credit 0.101*** 0.03 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.03 0.115***
(5.23) (1.46) (5.20) (5.21) (1.14) (5.88)
Fines intensity -0.822*** -0.770*** -0.818*** -0.772*** -0.761*** -0.783***
(16.63) (15.43) (16.50) (15.90) (15.69) (15.73)
Protected areas -0.045*** -0.027* -0.046*** -0.066*** -0.032** -0.058***
(2.59) (1.77) (2.65) (3.82) (2.08) (3.34)
Settlement 0.178*** 0.106*** 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.098*** 0.173***
(8.45) (5.31) (8.44) (8.55) (4.97) (8.61)
Area 0.648*** 0.499*** 0.648*** 0.566*** 0.470*** 0.534***
(9.68) (7.96) (9.66) (8.58) (7.30) (8.30)
Constant -6.215*** -3.244*** -5.968*** -5.901*** -3.400*** -6.268***
(10.05) (4.30) (9.58) (8.81) (3.93) (9.62)
Control variables No Yes No No Yes No
Year dummy No Yes No No Yes No
State dummy No Yes No No Yes No
Observations 1370 1336 1370 1370 1336 1370
Number of Municipalities 294 285 294 294 285 294
R-squared 0.58 0.72 0.58 0.61 0.72 0.60
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. R-squared is overall for RE models.







Table 5: Robustness checks and additional controls 
I II III IV V VI
RE RE RE RE RE RE
Meat price 0.073*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.112*** 0.077*** 0.119***
(15.09) (7.03) (5.13) (6.93) (11.83) (6.19)
Index meat price 2.011*** 0.54 (0.56) (0.09) 1.097** (0.71)
(4.46) (0.95) (1.18) (0.15) (2.15) (1.04)
Credit 0.085*** 0.03 0.173*** 0.052**
(4.17) (1.53) (7.31) (2.02)
Credit with zeros 0.035*** 0.014*
(4.30) (1.68)
Fines intensity in R$ -0.119*** -0.123***
(10.48) (10.24)
Fines intensity -0.773*** -0.765***
(15.42) (15.46)
Fines with zeros -0.569*** -0.551***
(15.82) (15.90)
Protected areas -0.080*** (0.03) -0.029* -0.037** -0.089*** -0.049***
(3.77) (1.54) (1.79) (2.39) (4.58) (2.82)
Settlement 0.246*** 0.144*** 0.116*** 0.094*** 0.205*** 0.130***
(12.21) (7.20) (6.58) (4.83) (8.89) (5.83)
Area 0.633*** 0.481*** 0.460*** 0.594*** 0.681*** 0.697***
(9.54) (7.23) (5.85) (7.37) (9.46) (7.56)
Rain over space -0.002** -0.002* -0.002*
(2.05) (1.87) (1.85)
Rain over time -0.637*** 1.517*** 1.661***
(3.98) (3.48) (3.22)
Initial deforested area 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(6.25) (7.05) (7.11) (6.47)
Initial population 0.00 0.00 0.007*** (0.00)
(1.42) (1.05) (2.66) (0.59)
Distance Brasilia (0.24) -0.268** (0.26) -0.534**
(0.93) (2.44) (1.11) (2.03)
Constant -7.266*** -3.945*** -2.407*** -7.700*** -8.085*** -7.802***
(11.03) (3.60) (2.69) (4.99) (10.95) (4.29)
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Year dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
State dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1938 1884 1331 1331 1370 1331
Number of Municipalities 323 314 282 282 294 282
R-squared 0.52 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.47 0.64
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. R-squared is overall for RE models.





This study analyzed the current determinants of deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon. It is based 
on a framework in which agents choose either to clear a forested area or not, based on their 
expectations  about  future  profits  to  be  derived  from  economic  activities  implemented  in  the 
cleared  area,  such  as  cattle  ranching  and  soybean  cropping.  Using  a  panel  data  of  783  
municipalities of the Brazilian Legal Amazon from 2002 to 2007 it tests how changes in several 
economic and policy variables affected the observed fluctuations in deforestation rates during the 
period. 
This study advances beyond previous studies in several aspects for the discussion about today’s 
determinants of deforestation. Firstly, in terms of data, it uses recently launched panel data of 
deforestation of the 2000s at municipal level. It also uses some data that has not been deeply or 
properly analyzed in econometric papers, such as municipal credit or commodity prices, and even 
some that has never been used, such as municipal environmental fines. Secondly, it focuses on 
the economic and policy decision parameters that affect agents’ deforestation decisions rather 
than on direct causes of clearing. Therefore it studies how the incentive structure for deforestation 
works. A  third aspect is that this study innovates by excluding from the analysis areas that were 
never  forest  or  that  are  almost  completely  deforested  in  order  to  better  assess  the  recent 
deforestation  drivers.  By  not  doing  this,  previous  works  included  important  biases  in  their 
analysis. 
A major empirical finding was the significance of all of the most important economic variables 
(meat and soybean prices) and policy variables (rural credit and environmental fines) studied as 
drivers of the fluctuations of deforestation rates during the period analyzed. According to the 
presented  theoretical  model,  changes  in  these  variables  are  responsible  for  changes  in  the 
expected profitability of future land use and therefore in the incentives for deforestation. By 
showing  empirically  that  the  fluctuation  of  these  variables  drive  the  ups  and  downs  of 
deforestation rates, we see that deforestation decisions are taken rationally by agents that are 
comparing expected profitability of different land use methods. More specifically, higher meat 
and soybean prices, as well as higher availability of official subsidized rural credit, are associated 
with higher deforestation rates. Meat price variations are found to drive deforestation rates, both 
from a time and space perspective. Higher issuing of environmental fines is associated with lower 
deforestation  rates.  The  existence  of  rural  reform  settlement  areas  is  related  to  larger 
deforestation,  whereas  the  presence  of  protected  areas  represents  a  barrier  to  deforestation. 
Additionally, lower rainfall, larger initial population and smaller distance to Brasilia are also 
associated with higher deforestation rates. 
There are a wide range of policy implications related to this study’s findings. The most important 
of them is that policy makers should recognize explicitly that the deforestation of the region is 
now an endogenous economic process driven by rational economic decisions made by agents that 
live  in  the  region.  Therefore  the  focus  of  new  policies  should  be  to  modify  the  economic 
incentive structure that agents face by changing the expected profits of different land use methods 
(sustainable versus unsustainable). 
One  more  specific  implication  is  that  commodity  prices,  and  also  commodity  future  prices, 
should be taken seriously in consideration for policy design, for deforestation forecasts and also 
for  evaluation  of  implemented  policies.  For  example,  the  Brazilian  government  has  openly 
claimed  that  the  new  plan  to  combat  illegal  deforestation  has  alone  driven  the  decrease  of 
deforestation rates from 2005 to 2007. This study shows that although the greater issuing of fines 
played an important role, the decrease in meat and soybean prices also contributed toward it.  
The evidence about the effectiveness of the environmental fines is probably the most innovative 
result of this study. Being aware of it, policy makers should intensify the combat against illegal 
deforestation. More studies are, however, necessary in order to understand in detail where, when  
and  under  which  conditions  this  combat  is  more  effective  and,  therefore,  how  it  should  be 
focused.  
Another major implication is that the credit granting rules and practices for farmers should be 
reviewed so that credit is only granted to those agents who respect the environmental legislation. 
Additionally  the  Brazilian  government  should  re-think  its  strategy  of  establishing  rural 
settlements in forested areas, and also consider the possibility of using already deforested areas
24.   
The  first  natural  extension  of  this  study  is  to  integrate  its  analysis  with  spatial  econometric 
techniques such as explicit controls for spatial autocorrelation. This could refine the accuracy of 
coefficient sizes.  
Another way to refine the sizes of coefficients is by doing variable specific studies. New studies 
are  being  conducted,  for  example,  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  protected  areas  comparing 
selected pixels inside and outside parks with similar characteristics. This type of study could be 
done with other variables as well. They do not substitute the kind of model proposed in this 
study, which tries to capture general patterns, but rather complement it. 
Other required extensions to this study, depend on data availability. For protected areas and rural 
settlements, using a complete dataset with all years should produce more accurate estimates. For 
rainfall,  besides  extra  data for  all  years,  more  effort  should  be  done  in  order to  improve  its 
specification and take in consideration the existence of threshold effects for example.  
Possibly,  the  most  important  extensions  of  this  study  concern  the  refinement  of  the  time 
dimension. It would be important to use monthly data, instead of yearly data, whenever possible, 
especially  because  deforestation  is  very  concentrated  in  some  months.  Furthermore,  because 
deforestation is measured from September to August, one should try to fit all the data into this 
time window, as I did with meat and soybean prices.  
Combining  econometrics  and  field  research  is  also  needed.  It  would  be  helpful  to  conduct 
interviews with deforestation agents to understand what kind of information they have access to 
and  what  part  of  this  information  is  more  important  to  them  when  they  take  their  clearing 
decisions.  It  would  also  be  important  for  understanding  the  timing  between  the  decision  of 
clearing, its execution and the beginning of an economic activity such as cattle ranching. One 
question, for example, is whether the deforestation agents look at current or future prices and, if 
future, what is the relevant time horizon considered. Once we know that, specifications can be 
improved and one can use future prices instead of ex-post observed lagged prices in models. It 
could be the case that not yearly average prices are relevant, but only future prices for 12 months, 
for example.  
Ultimately the goal is to find out when the deforestation decision is made and which variables are 
most important in an agents’ decision making process. After knowing that, new policies can be 
more efficiently designed to change the economic incentive structure to foster a more sustainable 
use of the Amazon region. 
                                                 
24 In line with it but not a direct implication of my results, there is an  urgent need for the implementation of 
“Zonemento ecológilo econômico” (Economic Ecological Land Use Planning) to promote a more sustainable and 
rational use of the forest.  
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